Henry Heller - Iron and Blood: Civil Wars in Sixteenth-Century
France by Holt, Mack P.
COMPTE RENDUS - BOOK REVIEWS 185
Henry HelIer - Iron and Blood: Civil Wars in Sixteenth-Century France. Montreal
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Henry HelIer's Iron and Blood is a natural sequel to his Conquest ofPoverty:
The Calvinist Revoit in Sixteenth-Century France (Leiden, 1986). In his earlier book,
he attempted to portray the rising tide of French Calvinism in the frrst half of the
sixteenth century as being fomented by economic hardship and distress and suggested
that the groundswelI of support for the new religion was composOO primarily of
artisans and the urban lower orders. In Iron and Blood, HelIer picks up where he left
off, and moves on to discuss the French religious wars of the second half of the
century. Neither a detailOO narrative histary of the civil wars nor a short survey for
beginners, the book is a briefpersonal interpretation ofwhy the wars were fought and
who benefittOO. Although many principal figures and key incidents are recounted
within, this is not the book ta turn ta for factual information or a detailed account of
a particuiar campaign. It is above all else a 150-page sustained argument.
The argument runs as follows. The rising level of social conflict and discontent
in the first half of the sixteenth century, as represented by the numerous evangelical
communities establishOO throughout the kingdom, 100 directly to the political, social,
and religious upheavals of the civil wars (1562-1598). As those most attractOO to the
new religion were from the lower orders, it was inevitable that the outbreak of
violence in the early 1560s would display "certain characteristics of a class conflict"
(12). Thus, aristocrats and notables from both church and state found themselves
pittOO against an alliance of craftsmen, lesser merchants, and plebeians. As was the
case in the revolution of 1789, sixteenth-century society "was dividOO by class
hostility, beset by growing poverty and economic crisis, and menaced by the spectre
of royal bankruptcy.... Like the eighteenth century, the sixteenth century had created
a elass of merchants and craftsmen who were preparOO ta challenge the religious as
well as the political and social foundations of the existing order" (47). With the
outbreak of war in the 1560s, the plebeian rank and fIle of the Huguenot movement
gave way ta the leadership of the bourgeoisie. Calvinist notables, wealthy merchants,
and professionals provided the organization and leadership that the earlier religious
revolts of the 1520s and 1540s sorely lacked. This new alliance turned the revolution
of the commoners into a counter-revolution by the aristocracy, as the nobles reacted
ta secure and sustain their rightful place at the top of society. As a result, control of
bath the Calvinist movement and the catholic reaction were seizedby the aristocracy
in order to guarantee the defeat of this plebeian-bourgeois alliance. Protestant and
catholic nobles workOO in tandem to ensure this end. Contemporaries were weIl aware
of this aristocratic conspiracy against the lower orders, as "Catholic nobles step aside
sa as to allow those of the new religion ta sack, pillage, and ransom the places
inhabitoo by Catholics. In like manner, the Protestant nobles allow the Catholics ta do
the same in areas inhabited by Protestants" (62). Clearly, "religion is beside the point",
as "nobles were using the religious wars to serve their ends at the expense of the rest
of society" (60, 65). In short, the civil wars "were a feudal reaction masterminded by
the nobility" (70).
The result of this class war was never in doubt. Unlike the revolution of 1789,
the class war of the sixteenth century was a revolution manquée. Even though
commoners of both religious railOO against the ravages of troops and the unfair
burdens of excessive taxes and subsidies, they were never to achieve their goal of a
"society of equals" (101). As the radical democratic implications of the Huguenot
republic in the Midi following the St. Bartholomews massacres were parallelIOO on
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the catholic side by the popular, democratic, and equally urban League in the 1580s
and early 1590s, aristocrats of both religions ultimately managed to wear down and
defeat the urban popular movements. Indeed, the stmctural weakness of both the
Huguenots and the League was the tension and contradiction between the radical,
popular movements in the towns and their aristocratic leadership (119). The
conclusion of this socio-economic war occurred in the mid-1590s as popular move-
ments all over France erupted into anti-seigneurial insurrection. The Croquants in the
southwest were only the prototype as commoners everywhere abandoned all rhetoric
of religion and revolted "against the continuation of the civil wars", viewing their
actions as "a repudiation of the nobility as weIl as the clergy" (120). The result was
rallying around the royalist cause of Henry of Navarre, who the commoners hoped
would end the aristocratic suppression and the nobles hoped would restore the social
order. Il was a pyrrhic victory for the aristocracy, however. Even though they retained
their place at the top of society and managed to subdue forther talk: ofdemocracy and
equality, they had lost ground in the process. "Il was the middle class - ranging from
officers to merchants, well-to-do artisans, and rich peasants - that was the principal
beneficiary of the civil war...[and] that seized the lion's share of land taken from the
Church or from the impoverished peasants." Thus, the civil wars "were at one and the
same time a seigneurial reaction and an important phase of bourgeois 'primitive
accumulation'" (138). In this sense, "the defeatofthe middle class ought not to blind
us to the fact of its relative ascension throughout the sixteenth century" (149). The
bourgeoisie survived to fight another day in 1789.
To say the least, this is a novel view of the Wars of Religion, indeed a Wars of
Religion without religion at all. The old corpse of "the rise of the middle class", slain
by J.H. Hexter more than four decades ago, was long thought to be dead and buried.
Professor Heller has not only attempted to breathe sorne life back into il, but he has
got it twitehing and trying to sit boIt upright To he sure, my encapsulation of his
argument above, though 1 think fairly representative of his views, is not as nuanced
or as subtle as he might wish. Nevertheless, 1 think il fair to say that early modemists
have abandoned the unreconstmcted marxist approach to history about as thoroughly
as scholars of the French Revolution. So, Heller's explanation of the Wars ofReligion
raises a number of questions in light of both the evidence and much recent research.
If religious discontent in the frrst half of the century was tmly built upon economic
hardship, why did an overwhelming majority ofartisans, craftsmen, and plebeians all
over France choose to remain loyal to the traditional church? If class rather than
religion divided Frenchmen in the civil wars, why did noble slay noble, merchant slay
merchant, and artisan kill artisan by the score? Was it just coincidence that Philip II
and the pope supported one side while Elizabeth and William of Orange aided the
other? Rather than trying to snuff out the popular movement of the Huguenots around
mid-century, did not the conversion of scores of nobles to the new religion provide it
a lifeline, without which il would have succumbed to royal suppression? Is aU the
violence of the civil wars(or even most of it?) best explained by class war? 1 would
venture that most historians find Natalie Davis's "rites of violence" a far more
plausible explanation. And it is really fair to argue that the civil wars were finally
brought to an end in the 15908 because of"concerted popular protest" (149)? Did the
abjuration of Henry ofNavarre and his settlement with the towns and aristocrats really
play only a minor role? These are all questions that are raised by the book's
conclusions but left unanswered. The recent books by Denis Crouzet and Barbara
Diefendorf, for just two examples (and they appeared too late for Professor Heller to
consult), both argue very persuasively in slightly different ways that religion was at
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the heart of the violence of the civil wars. And this does not even take account of
similar views of many of the authors that Heller does cite.
The book is not without merit, however, and it would he a pity if readers
dismissed Professor HelIer out of hand because of his unorthodox views. It is useful
to he reminded from time to time that social tension was a permanent feature of the
Ancien Régime, and that whatever vertical bonds existed to bridge the social gulf -
and religion was one such bond in the sixteenth century - that class tension was a
structural component of this hierarchical society. This tension often erupted into
violence during times of economic hardship, as the many examples Professor HelIer
cites from the fifteenth century to the end of the Ancien Régime attest. Moreover, 1
would agree with him that the most extreme interpretations of Roland Mousnier's
"society of orders" tend to underplay or even eliminate the tension altogether. Thus,
in my view, chapter 6 on the Croquants and other revolts of the mid-1590s is the
strongest of the book. Here, the evidence does support his view that there were many
Frenchmen (and even a few women) al1 over France who were tired of war,
disillusioned by the League, and ready to use force to protect their families and
property from all armies. AlI the anecdotal evidence compiled by Professor HelIer,
however, is still not enough to persuade me that "from start to finish, the wars
represented a kind of class war from above" (136).
MackP.Holt
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Bruce W. Hodgins et Jamie Benidickson - The Temagami Experience: Recreation,
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Au Canada, comme à l'étranger, les problèmes des Amérindiens ne laissent plus
les historiennes et les historiens indifférents. Les abus des gouvernements fédéral
et provinciaux ont abouti dans de nombreux cas à leur conférer une attitude
renonciatrice en ce qui concerne le respect des droits des Autochtones ainsi que de
leur environnement. C'est dans ce contexte que s'inscrit le livre de Bruce W. Hodgins
et de Jamie Benidickson, The Temagami Experience.
Cet ouvrage est bourré d'informations qui permettent de comprendre
l'évolution du territoire des Temeaugama Anishnabai, situé aa-nord-est de l'Ontario.
Le « peuple de l'eau profonde» était installé dans la région de Temagami, sur une
étendue d'environ 9 840 km2, depuis au moins 5 000 ans. Les contacts avec les
Français d'abord, puis avec les Anglais, bouleversèrent leur vie paisible, occupée
jusque-là par la chasse et la pêche, et les entraînèrent dans l'impitoyable compétition
de la traite des fourrures. La « Proclamation» du roi George III en 1763 et le traité
Robinson-Huron en 1850 furent les deux premières tentatives gouvernementales de
délimitation du territoire des Temeaugama. La signature du traité est à la source de la
dispute qui s'est développée entre les Autochtones et le gouvernement. En effet, les
Temeaugama partent du principe que n'ayant pas signé le traité Robinson-Huron, ils
ont le droit de reprendre leurs terres. Selon les auteurs, il n'existe aucune preuve que
les Autochtones aient participé aux réunions préliminaires ou même à la signature du
